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Studies have shown that personswithDown syndrome (DS) exhibit relatively poor language
capacities, and impaired verbal and visuoperceptual memory, whereas their visuospatial
memory capacities appear comparatively spared. Individuals with DS recall better where
an object was previously seen thanwhat object was previously seen. However, most of the
evidence concerning preserved visuospatialmemory comes from tabletop or computerized
experiments which are biased toward testing egocentric (viewpoint-dependent) spatial
representations. Accordingly, allocentric (viewpoint-independent) spatial learning and
memory capacities may not be necessary to perform these tasks. Thus, in order to
more fully characterize the spatial capacities of individuals with DS, allocentric processes
underlying real-world navigation must also be investigated.We tested 20 participants with
DS and 16mental age-matched, typically developing (TD) children in a real-world, allocentric
spatial (AS) memory task. During local cue (LC) trials, participants had to locate three
rewards marked by local color cues, among 12 locations distributed in a 4 m × 4 m arena.
During AS trials, participants had to locate the same three rewards, in absence of LCs,
based on their relations to distal environmental cues. All TD participants chose rewarded
locations in LC and AS trials at above chance level. In contrast, although all but one of the
participantswith DS exhibited a preference for the rewarded locations in LC trials, only 50%
of participants with DS chose the rewarded locations at above chance level in AS trials. As
a group, participants with DS performed worse than TD children on all measures of task
performance.These ﬁndings demonstrate that individuals with DS are impaired at using an
AS representation to learn and remember discrete locations in a controlled environment,
suggesting persistent and pervasive deﬁcits in hippocampus-dependent memory in DS.
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INTRODUCTION
DOWN SYNDROME: GENERAL COGNITIVE PROFILE AND SMALL-SCALE
SPATIAL CAPACITIES
Down syndrome (DS) is the most common genetic cause of intel-
lectual disability, with an incidence of 1 in 625–1,000 live births
(Bittles et al., 2006; Weijerman et al., 2008). It results from the
presence of a partial or complete triplication (trisomy) of chro-
mosome 21. Adults with DS have IQs ranging from 30 to 70
and a typical mental age (MA) ranging from 5 to 9 years of
age (Vicari et al., 2005, 2006). Traditionally, individuals with DS
were considered to have uniform intellectual impairments affect-
ing all cognitive domains. However, a number of studies, which
compared the capacities of individuals with DS to those of indi-
viduals with Williams Syndrome and other intellectual disorders,
led to the identiﬁcation of a unique DS cognitive proﬁle (Bihrle
et al., 1989; Wang and Bellugi, 1994; Jarrold et al., 1999, 2007;
Vicari et al., 2005, 2006; Porter and Coltheart, 2006; Vicari and
Carlesimo, 2006; Bussy et al., 2011; Carney et al., 2013). For exam-
ple, persons with DS exhibit relatively poor language capacities,
with impairments in receptive and expressive language (Chap-
man et al., 1991; Chapman, 1997), and speciﬁc difﬁculties in
syntactical processing (Abbeduto et al., 2003, 2007). Impaired ver-
bal short-term memory (Jarrold and Baddeley, 1997), especially
for phonological information (Raitano Lee et al., 2010), might
underlie certain aspects of these language deﬁcits. Individuals
with DS also exhibit a global processing bias, neglecting inter-
nal details when reconstructing stimuli in the block-design task
or in the Delis (Navon) hierarchical processing task (Bellugi et al.,
1999). In contrast, individuals with DS show relatively preserved
visuospatial memory when asked to recall where objects previ-
ously appeared within a display placed directly in front of them.
For example, they perform similar to MA-matched typically-
developing (TD) controls on the Corsi block-tapping task (Wang
and Bellugi, 1994; Jarrold and Baddeley, 1997; Numminen et al.,
2001; Laws, 2002) when stimuli are presented sequentially (but
not necessarily when visuospatial stimuli are presented simulta-
neously (Lanfranchi et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2014)). Finally, in a
study comparing visual object versus visuospatial memory, indi-
viduals with DS exhibited better recall for the previously seen
position of an object on a sheet of paper (where), than for the
form of the object that was previously seen (what ; Vicari et al.,
2005).
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Perhaps because performance on the small-scale visuospa-
tial tasks described above is relatively preserved in individuals
with DS, few studies have investigated their large-scale spa-
tial memory capacities. However, performance on small-scale
spatial tasks does not necessarily correlate with or predict per-
formance on large-scale spatial tasks in which participants must
move around (Quaiser-Pohl et al., 2004; Hegarty et al., 2006; Far-
ran et al., 2010). We describe below why the inherent nature of
small-scale visuospatial tasks makes them inappropriate for pre-
dicting performance on real-world orientation and navigation
tasks, and why, in order to deﬁne a comprehensive cognitive
proﬁle of DS, it is fundamental to investigate the capacities of
individuals withDS in large-scale, allocentric spatial (AS)memory
tasks.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VISUOSPATIAL MEMORY AND ALLOCENTRIC
SPATIAL MEMORY
The importance and utility of using visuospatial paradigms to
study visuospatial memory cannot be overstated. However, visu-
ospatial memory is just one component in the broader domain
of spatial memory, and indeed its contribution to solving spatial
tasks involving navigation in the real-world is not entirely clear.
Although visuospatial tasks are indeed spatial in the sense that
participants must localize targets, the fact that the vast major-
ity of visuospatial memory tasks are conducted on a computer
screen, or on a piece of paper presented in front of a participant
(i.e., “desktop” or “pencil and paper” tasks) limits their general-
izability to the broader domain of spatial memory in several key
ways.
First, experiments in rodents, monkeys, and humans have
yielded consistent results suggesting that there are multiple types
of spatial knowledge, and that objects and locations in the envi-
ronment can be deﬁnedwith respect to distinct frames of reference
[see (Burgess, 2006) for a review]. An egocentric spatial frame of
reference deﬁnes locations with respect to their position relative to
one’s body, in a viewpoint-dependent manner. Thus, locations can
be on one’s right, one’s left, behind or in front of one. When navi-
gating, the route to a destination can be encoded as a sequence of
landmarks and egocentric turns (e.g., from the hotel, go straight to
the convenience store on the corner, turn right, walk two blocks,
the restaurant is on the left). In contrast, an AS frame of ref-
erence deﬁnes locations with respect to their position relative to
other objects or locations in the environment, in a viewpoint-
independent manner, allowing the construction of a cognitive
map of one’s environment (Tolman, 1948). Thus, for example,
a speaker’s lecturn is both in front of the audience and on the
left of the projection screen, and will maintain these same rela-
tions irrelevant of where an observer is standing in the lecture
hall. When navigating, a destination encoded in allocentric coor-
dinates is deﬁned by its relations with multiple other locations
in the environment, thus allowing the navigator to arrive at the
desired destination using even a novel, never-before experienced
path.
Second, it is critical to realize that AS memory is not limited
to the processing of information from any one sensory modal-
ity, such as vision. Instead, AS memory is dependent on the
integration of information derived from all sensory modalities,
including primarily visual, vestibular, and proprioceptive infor-
mation, but also auditory, olfactory and somatosensory infor-
mation. In this manner, AS memory may exist in absence of
vision: allocentric representations persist when individuals are
physically removed from the target location so that it can-
not be seen, when individuals navigate in the dark (Quirk
et al., 1990; Save, 1997), and in blind individuals (Passini and
Proulx, 1988; Loomis et al., 1993). Thus, while visuospatial
information may normally contribute to building an allocen-
tric representation of the environment, visual information is
not processed independently from other sensory information
(Etienne and Jeffery, 2004). Accordingly, the response proper-
ties of place cells (i.e., neurons in the hippocampal formation
that encode spatial locations in an allocentric frame of refer-
ence) are less speciﬁc when only visual information is available,
as compared to when coherent visual, vestibular and proprio-
ceptive information is available (Matsumura et al., 1999; Ravas-
sard et al., 2013), but, critically, have been shown to maintain
their location-selective ﬁring properties in blind rats (Save et al.,
1998).
Finally, whereas large-scale spatial tasks can be used to assess
either egocentric spatial memory processes or AS memory pro-
cesses, highly controlled large-scale spatial tasks are best suited to
assess AS memory. Indeed, small-scale visuospatial tasks which are
administereddirectly in front of stationary subjects likely implicate
egocentric processes preferentially [but see (Wang and Simons,
1997; Simons and Wang, 1998; Burgess et al., 2004; Nardini et al.,
2006; Banta Lavenex et al., 2011), for visuospatial tasks in which
the experimental apparatus and/or the participantsmove]. In con-
trast, large-scale spatial tasks in which subjects must move around,
and in which egocentric strategies are precluded (by eliminat-
ing landmarks that can be directly associated with goal locations
and by having participants solve the task from multiple starting
locations), can better assess AS capacities, and can serve as a spe-
ciﬁc assay for hippocampus-dependent memory function. Indeed,
although the hippocampal formation is known to be critical for
episodic and relationalmemory functions in humans (Scoville and
Milner, 1957; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993), its role in AS mem-
ory has been the most studied and is the best understood across
species, from rats, to monkeys, to humans (O’Keefe and Dostro-
vsky, 1971; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Morris et al., 1982; Banta
Lavenex et al., 2006, 2014).
LARGE-SCALE SPATIAL CAPACITIES IN DOWN SYNDROME
To date, only one study investigated real-world, large-scale spa-
tial capacities in DS. In his doctoral thesis, Mangan conducted
spatial memory experiments designed to study the response learn-
ing, cue learning, and place learning capacities of children with
DS and chronologically age-matched TD children from 16 to
28 months of age (Mangan, 1992). He used a modiﬁed version
of the holeboard apparatus originally designed for studying AS
memory in rats, which consisted of a round platform (3.65 m in
diameter) containing 11 symmetrically arranged holes that could
hide rewards. The response learning task was an egocentric task
that required children to always turn in the same direction on
the platform to ﬁnd the reward; for example, after watching the
reward being hidden in one of the four holes surrounding the
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center hole (and always the same hole for any given child), the
child was moved to the center of the platform. From here, if
they turned to the right, for example, they would always ﬁnd
the rewarded hole. The cue task could be solved by visual guid-
ance (a non-spatial strategy) since the rewarded hole was always
covered by a uniquely colored lid; for example, after watching the
reward being hidden in one of the four holes surrounding the
center hole and then covered by, for example, the yellow lid, the
child was placed in a randomly selected position on the platform.
If the child then localized the hole covered by the yellow lid, they
would always ﬁnd the rewarded hole. For both the response task
and the cue task, although children with DS needed more trials
than TD children to solve the task, they were nonetheless able
to ﬁnd the reward in a ﬁnal probe trial (PT), following a 1-min
delay between when the object was hidden and when the child
was allowed to search. In contrast, the performance of children
with DS was reported to differ signiﬁcantly more from that of
TD children on the place learning task, a task which requires AS
processing. In this task, after watching the reward being hidden
(in one of the four holes surrounding the center hole, and always
the same hole for any given child), children were started from a
different pseudo-randomly chosen location on the outside edge
of the platform for every trial. Children needed to use an allocen-
tric representation to identify the location of the rewarded hole,
i.e., the position of the rewarded hole relative to distal environ-
mental cues in the room. As for the response and cue learning
tasks, children with DS required more trials than TD children to
learn the place learning task. However, during the PT (after 1 min
betweenhiding and searching) childrenwithDSdidnot focus their
search at the goal location, and instead searched locations sur-
rounding their start location on the outside edge of the platform,
suggestingmemory impairments speciﬁc toASmemory processes.
Nevertheless, because Mangan (1992) studied the spatial abilities
of very young (16–28 month-old) children with DS, his results
might be inconclusive. Basic AS memory capacities do not emerge
in TD children until around 24 months of age (Newcombe et al.,
1998; Ribordy et al., 2013), and even then allocentric processes
are far from mature (Ribordy et al., 2013; Ribordy Lambert et al.,
accepted). This leaves the possibility that the development of AS
memory processes is only delayed in young individuals with DS,
and that they may continue to develop normally, albeit with a
slower time course than in TD children. To address this question
the AS capacities of fully developed individuals with DS must be
assessed.
DS SPATIAL CAPACITIES IN VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS
Three studies investigated the spatial capacities of individuals
with DS in virtual environments and found their performance
impaired. In theory, virtual environments are designed to emu-
late real-world large-scale environments, and therefore should be
able to test AS abilities (but see below). In a ﬁrst study, to deter-
mine whether cognitive deﬁcits seen in DS were more speciﬁcally
consistent with dysfunction associated with the hippocampus or
the prefrontal cortex, Pennington et al. (2003) tested mature par-
ticipants with DS [mean chronological age (CA): 14.7 years] and
MA-matched TD children (mean CA: 4.9 years) on a battery of
neuropsychological tests designed to asses the function of these
two cortical regions. One of the tasks was a virtual Morris water
maze. In the real-world Morris water maze used with rodents, the
animals’ ability to ﬁnd an invisible platform slightly submerged
under water is impaired by hippocampal damage (Morris et al.,
1982). In Pennington’s study, children had to learn the position of
a“rug” in themiddle of a virtual room containing distal visual cues
such as a door, a picture frame, etc. During a 90-s PT (the only
data reported for this task), participants with DS spent less time
searching in the correct quadrant than TD children. Overall, par-
ticipants with DS exhibited worse performance than TD children
on a battery of tasks evaluating hippocampal function. In con-
trast, in tasks evaluating prefrontal cortex function, participants
with DS did not differ from MA-matched children (Pennington
et al., 2003).
In a second study, Courbois et al. (2013) investigated the
wayﬁnding behavior of mature individuals with DS in a virtual
town containing three target buildings and a number of visual
landmarks. Participants with DS (CA: 14.2–29.9 years; MA: 7–
9 years), and MA-matched and CA-matched TD participants were
trained on two different routes, A–B and A–C, consecutively. By
the end of training, 10/10 CA, 9/10 MA and 7/10 participants
with DS had learned the two routes (evidenced by two con-
secutive trials without errors). However, participants with DS
learned fewer landmarks located along the routes than MA and
CA participants. In addition, DS and MA participants made more
wrong choices along the routes than CA participants, and the
distance traveled by participants with DS on their last trial was
longer than that of MA and CA participants. Finally, on a short-
cut trial performed by participants who had learned the routes,
10/10 CA participants, 5/9 MA participants and 2/7 DS partici-
pants were able to take a previously untraveled shortcut between
known routes. Thus, some of these ﬁndings suggest speciﬁc spa-
tial impairments in individuals with DS, whereas other measures
of spatial capacities seem related to MA in both DS and TD
individuals.
Similarly, Purser et al. (2014) investigated the development of
route learning in DS using virtual environments. They found that
both individuals with DS and TD individuals were able to use
different types of landmarks (i.e., located near junctions, fur-
ther from junctions along the route, and distal landmarks) to aid
route learning. Nonetheless, inmazes where only junction or route
landmarks were available, individuals with DS made more errors
than MA-matched TD individuals; low non-verbal ability had a
more signiﬁcant impact on the performance of individuals with
DS than on TD individuals. In contrast, in mazes where only
distal, extra-maze landmarks were available, although individuals
with DS still made more errors than TD individuals, non-verbal
ability correlated similarly with performance in both groups of
individuals.
DIFFERENCES BETWEN VIRTUAL AND REAL ENVIRONMENTS
Although virtual environments are often used to assess allocen-
tric capacities in humans (Skelton et al., 2000; Astur et al., 2002;
Hamilton et al., 2003), their ethological validity has been ques-
tioned (Taube et al., 2013; Banta Lavenex et al., 2014). In the
real world, information derived from different sensory modali-
ties is coherent and fully integrated by the brain, including the
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hippocampus, to elaborate consistent representations of personal
experience. In contrast, in virtual reality studies, different inputs
derived from different sensory modalities are inconsistent, so that
both cooperative and competitive interactions between sensory
cues inﬂuence hippocampal place cell activity (Ravassard et al.,
2013). Accordingly, in the case of a person sitting in front of
a computer screen, vestibular, proprioceptive, and tactile infor-
mation are all coherently coding the absence of movement of
the individual, whereas visual information is typically used to
make the person believe that s/he is actively or passively mov-
ing while exploring the virtual environment. Although one might
argue that humans are accustomed to such discrepancies due to
their use of modern modes of transportation, one cannot ignore
the fact that these conditions are fundamentally different from
those experienced in the real world. Indeed, recordings of hip-
pocampal place cells in animals navigating in virtual environments
reveal that, as compared to real world navigation, theta frequency
is reduced and its speed dependence abolished in rats (Ravas-
sard et al., 2013), and in monkeys fewer place cells are activated
and their place ﬁelds are smaller (Matsumura et al., 1999). Thus,
whereas ﬁndings that demonstrate AS competence in virtual envi-
ronments may be convincing, impaired performance in virtual
environments cannot be considered as unequivocal evidence for
the impairment of real-world AS capacities, especially in children
or individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders or neurological
impairments.
AIM OF THE CURRENT STUDY
In sum, data from twodifferent lines of research lead to two oppos-
ing predictions with respect to real-world AS processing capacities
in DS. The preserved visuospatial capacities of individuals with
DS tested on small-scale spatial tasks predict that individuals with
DS should exhibit similarly preserved large-scale, AS capacities. In
contrast, the few experimental ﬁndings from individuals with DS
tested in real-world and virtual tasks designed to assess allocen-
tric capacities suggest that individuals with DS have AS memory
impairments. Moreover, reports of speciﬁc hippocampal pathol-
ogy in DS (see Contestabile et al., 2010 for a review) predict that
this second hypothesis is more likely. However, additional cor-
roborating evidence is needed to support the hypotheses that (1)
DS is associated with its own uneven cognitive proﬁle, reﬂecting
some relatively preserved egocentric visuospatial capacities and
impaired AS capacities, and (2) speciﬁc hippocampal dysfunc-
tion may underlie several aspects of impaired cognition in persons
with DS.
In order to better deﬁne the nature of AS memory processing
in DS, we tested 20 participants with DS and 16 MA-matched
TD children in a real-world, AS memory task. Participants
were asked to ﬁnd three rewards hidden among 12 potentially
rewarded locations distributed in a 4 m × 4 m arena. On half
of the trials, a local cue (LC; a red cup) marked the rewarded
locations, thus allowing participants to use a visual guidance
strategy to ﬁnd the rewards. On the other half of the trials,
no LC marked the rewarded locations, and instead participants
had to form and rely on an allocentric representation of the
rewarded locations in order to ﬁnd the rewards. We hypothe-
sized that participants with DS would perform as well as TD
children in presence of LCs, but would be impaired in the AS
condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS AND OVERALL ORGANIZATION OF TESTING
Participants were 20 individuals with DS (10 females, 10 males;
average CA: 18.81 years, range: 11.74–29.70 years; average MA:
5.30 years, range: 4.67–6.67 years), and 16 MA-matched, typ-
ically developing (TD) children enrolled in the public school
system without special education assistance (seven males, nine
females; average CA: 4.91 years, range: 4.08–6.07 years; average
MA: 4.97 years, range: 3.90–6.16 years). Participants with DS were
recruited with the help of the Down Syndrome Family Associa-
tion (Nardò, Lecce) via the Bambino Gesù Children’s Hospital in
Rome which follows individuals with DS for periodical examina-
tion. All individuals with DS were diagnosed with free trisomy
21 via karyotyping. Individuals with DS that had neurosensory
deﬁcits, such as hypoacusia, serious visual impairment, or epilepsy
were not included in the study. All individuals with DS lived with
their families. TD participants were recruited via parents in local
neighborhoods.
For the AS memory task, participants with DS were tested
during two 45-min sessions on two consecutive days. On a sepa-
rate day, the MA of individuals with DS was evaluated using the
Leiter International Performance Scale-Revised (Leiter-R; Subtests
included in the Brief IQ from which MA is calculated are: Figure
Ground, Form Completion, Sequential Order, and Repeated Pat-
terns; Roid and Miller, 1997). TD participants were tested during
two sessions on two consecutive days, one session of ∼45 min and
another of ∼30min. MAwas evaluatedwith the sameLeiter-R bat-
tery in a separate 30 min session at the end of the second session.
All testing took place between 8:00 A.M. and 6:30 P.M. Human
subjects research was approved by the Cantonal Ethics Commis-
sion (Vaud) for Human Research (protocol no. 60/14), and was in
accordance with the NIH guidelines for the use of human subjects
in research. The parents of all participants gave informed written
consent.
TESTING FACILITIES
We had testing facilities in two different locations: TD participants
were tested in the canton of Vaud, Switzerland (Figures 1A,B).
Participants with DS were tested in Nardò, Italy. The main fea-
tures of the testing facilities were consistent between the two sites.
Testing took place within large rectangular rooms (9 m × 6 m in
Vaud and 12 × 8 m in Nardò) containing many polarizing features
such as doors, obscured windows, tables, chairs, wall posters, etc.
Within the room, we placed a 4 m × 4 m testing arena (Figure 1)
that consisted of three walls made of suspended, opaque plastic
curtains (2 m high). Whereas the curtain on the back wall was 4 m
wide, the curtains on the side walls extended only 3 m, so that
there was a 50 cm gap at the front and the back of the wall, thus
creating four entry points through which participants passed in
order to enter and exit the arena. The fourth (front) boundary of
the arena was delineated by a rope attached to the two opposing
sides of the arena, and suspended 30 cm off the ground. Exterior
to the two side walls, the inter-trial waiting area was a corridor
(1 m × 4 m) that contained two chairs with their backs to the
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup. (A) Picture of a TD participant in the
arena in the local cue (LC) condition (note the three red cups at positions
5, 8, and 10). (B) Picture of a TD participant in the arena in the allocentric
spatial (AS) condition (all cups are white). (C) Schematic representation of
the experimental arena, with the 12 potential locations and their actual
positions in the arena. The three rewarded locations were: location 5 on the
outer array, location 8 on the middle array, and location 10 on the inner
array.
arena, and various items including a trash can, occluded windows,
doors, posters, etc. Importantly, from within the arena, and from
the inter-trial waiting area, participants had access to distant visual
cues in front of the arena. Objects found in front of the arena (a
table covered with a colorful tablecloth, chairs, the experimenter,
camera, etc.) were placed 3 m away from the front of the arena in
both the Vaud and Nardò testing rooms.
The arena ﬂoors were uniform in both the Vaud and Nardò
testing rooms and thus provided no visual guidance cues: In
Vaud, a solid blue carpet covered the testing area. In Nardò, the
ﬂoor consisted of uniform square tiles. The testing arenas were
void of all objects except for 12 symmetrically arranged white
paper plates (18 cm in diameter; Figure 1). The 12 locations
were arranged on three nested square arrays (Figure 1C): The
outer array (rotated 45◦ with respect to the orientation of the
arena) comprised locations 1, 3, 5, 7; The middle array com-
prised locations 2, 4, 6, 8; The inner array (rotated 45◦ with
respect to the orientation of the arena) comprised locations 9,
10, 11, 12. An inverted opaque plastic cup (7.5 cm in diameter,
6.5 cm high) was placed on each paper plate. A reward was placed
under the inverted cups at locations 5, 8, and 10 (Figure 1). Par-
ticipants had to lift or turn over the plastic cups to obtain the
reward. Rewards were coins for individuals with DS and “treats”
(e.g., Smarties®, Goldﬁsh® crackers, pieces of breakfast cereal or
pretzels) for TD children. Parents of TD children were queried
with respect to alimentary allergies prior to testing. All test-
ing was videotaped with a video camera located in front of the
arena.
SPECIFIC TESTING PROCEDURES
All testing involved a team of two experimenters. Experimenter 1
(E1)would staywith the participant throughout the testing session
and would enter the arena with the participant, encourage the
participant to search for the hidden rewards, verbally praise the
participant when a reward was found, pick up cups as soon as
they had been searched by the participant and place them in a
plastic bucket that she carried, direct the participant to the correct
exit at the end of the trial, and occupy the participant during the
inter-trial interval by reading or talking. Experimenter 2 (E2) was
responsible for replacing the rewards between trials, recording the
data, and announcing the correct entry and exit doors to E1. Before
testing began, participants viewed the arena with the 12 arranged
plates (no inverted cups were present), from in front of the arena.
While still in front of the arena, E1 then showed the participant
a reward item on a paper plate that she held in her hand. While
the participant was watching, E1 would lower a plastic white cup
over the reward to hide it. The participant would then be asked
“Where is the treat/coin? Can you show me where it is?” When
the participant lifted the cup to expose the reward, he/she would
be verbally praised and told that it was his/hers to keep. Once
the participant had been shown that a reward could be found
underneath the plastic cup, the participant and E1 would go to the
predetermined side of the arena where testing would begin. Once
the participant was behind the curtain and occupied, E2 would
hide a reward at each of the three predetermined reward locations
(locations 5, 8, and 10; Figure 1).
Children completed two different types of trials: (1) LC trials,
in which a LC, speciﬁcally red cups, covered the rewards, whereas
all other non-rewarded locations were covered with white cups
(Figure 1). This condition allowed us to gage participants’ moti-
vation to participate, as well as to test each participant’s ability
to ﬁnd rewards at spatially ﬁxed locations marked by LCs (red
cups). In this condition, participants could ﬁnd and remem-
ber the reward locations either by associating the presence of
the LC with the reward, or by remembering the absolute spa-
tial locations of the rewards based on their relations to distal
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environmental objects. (2) AS trials, in which no LCs marked
the reward locations, as identical white cups covered all locations.
In this case, participants could not discriminate between rewarded
andnever-rewarded locations based on local features. Instead, par-
ticipants had to rely on an AS representation of the environment
to discriminate these locations, i.e., coding the absolute goal loca-
tions in relation to distal environmental objects. Each participant
had a total of 20 trials (10 LC and 10 AS trials) distributed over
two sessions on two separate days; LC and AS trials alternated.
In addition, the ﬁrst trial of Day 2 was a PT in the AS condi-
tion to test participants’ long-term (24 h) memory for the reward
locations; the three same locations were rewarded as usual. Fol-
lowing the PT, LC, and AS trials continued in the same alternating
manner as for the ﬁrst day. The entire testing schedule was thus
as follows; Day 1: LC1, AS1, LC2, AS2, LC3, AS3, LC4, AS4, LC5,
AS5; Day 2: PT, LC6, AS6, LC7, AS7, LC8, AS8, LC9, AS9, LC10,
AS10.
As described above, there were four entries and exits to the
arena. Entry order was determined in a pseudo-random manner,
with respect to the following conditions: (1) All entrances should
be used an equal number of times in the two conditions (LC andAS
conditions) across the 2 days; (2) Participants may never enter the
arena through a door which they had just exited on the immedi-
ately preceding trial (to preclude the use of egocentric strategies);
(3) Two successive trials should never have the same entry; and
(4) All entries must be made from the same side (right or left) that
the participant just exited on the previous trial (i.e., participants
were not moved from one side of the arena to the other between
trials). At the end of the trial, E2 would call out the appropriate
exit number, and E1 would guide the participant to that exit by
pointing or by heading there ﬁrst (all participants were required
to walk to and through the exit on their own and were never led
by taking their hand), therefore ensuring that the participant was
on the appropriate side of the arena for the next trial. Partici-
pants were thus constantly moving about the arena from trial to
trial, entering and exiting on different sides, and at the back or
front of the arena. Moreover, no environmental landmarks, such
as doors, windows, or furniture, could be found adjacent to or
directly behind any of the reward locations (with the exception of
the red cups in the LC condition). Consequently, in order to iden-
tify the reward locations in the absence of the LCs, participants
must rely on an allocentric, spatial representation of their envi-
ronment (Banta Lavenex and Lavenex, 2009, 2010; Banta Lavenex
et al., 2014).
VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS AND FEEDBACK
The goal of the experiment was to determine whether each par-
ticipant possessed the capacity to utilize an allocentric, spatial
relational representation of the environment in order to identify
the reward locations. However, when working with children or
individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders, it is important to
ensure that each participant understands the basic requirements
to perform the task. Even though we have previously shown that
adults need no verbal instructions to exhibit successful perfor-
mance (Banta Lavenex and Lavenex, 2010), we previously found
that childrenbetween48 and60months of age are very uncomfort-
able not receiving any kind of verbal instructions or feedback, and
in fact perform worse than younger children (30–45 months) who
have fewer problems performing the task without verbal instruc-
tions or feedback. Overman et al. (1996) found very similar results
in a Morris search task. Thus, in order to give all participants,
individuals with DS and MA-matched TD children, the great-
est possibility of succeeding, we gave speciﬁc verbal instructions
and as much feedback/encouragement as possible. Speciﬁcally,
upon entering the arena on the ﬁrst trial, E1 would explain to
the participant that s/he was going to see some cups, and that if
s/he looked under the cups s/he would ﬁnd some rewards (i.e.,
“coins” or “treats”). At this point, participants would begin to
slowly lift cups one-by-one until they found the rewards. Once a
location was searched, E1 would provide verbal feedback, praising
the participant for ﬁnding a reward, consoling and encouraging
the participant when a reward was not found. Verbal instruc-
tion/feedback did not vary in quantity or meaning between DS
andTDparticipants. OneparticipantwithDShadphysical impair-
ments which made it difﬁcult for him to bend over to search under
the cups. Instead, this participant would stand next to the cup that
he wanted to search and point to it, after which E1 would lift the
cup for him.
Although participants were given as much verbal instruction,
encouragement, and praise as possible in order to help them per-
form the task, they were never told or shown where the rewards
were, or how to identify their locations. Speciﬁcally, they were
never told that when the red cups were present they could ﬁnd the
rewards there, nor were they verbally alerted to the spatial relations
between distal objects in the room and the reward locations. Both
experimenters, and any observing parents, wore dark sunglasses
while the participant was in the arena in order to avoid uninten-
tionally cuing the participant as to the locations of the rewards
with eye gaze.
Finally, although many participants had a tendency to spon-
taneously continue to lift other unrewarded cups after they had
found the rewards, if they did not, they were encouraged to do
so (at least for the ﬁrst two or three trials) in order to make sure
that the participant understood the rules of the game (i.e., which
locations hid rewards and which ones did not, and that these loca-
tions remained the same from trial to trial). Indeed, in accordance
with ﬁndings from our previous studies using this task with TD
children and adults (Banta Lavenex and Lavenex, 2010; Ribordy
et al., 2013), it is critical to let participants explore without penalty
as much as they feel necessary, in order to preclude them from
exploring before choosing the correct locations, thus confound-
ing their natural desire to explore in order to verify their response
and/or the rules of the game with their real performance on the
task.
DATA ANALYSIS
Above chance performance was determined for each individual
with a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing the
number of correct choices (visiting a rewarded location) and the
number of incorrect choices (visiting a non-rewarded location)
for the ten LC trials and the ten AS trials. We considered both the
ﬁrst choice and the ﬁrst three choices upon entering the arena,
and normalized the numbers of choices based on the probability
to make those choices: the number of correct choices was divided
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by three, as there were three rewarded locations, and the number
of incorrect choices was divided by nine, as there were nine non-
rewarded locations.
Because the latency to solve a task might be inﬂuenced by dif-
ferent factors such as conﬁdence, strategy, and motivation, we do
not rely on latency as a measure of spatial memory ability. Instead,
we determine whether participants are accurate at recalling the
reward locations by determining whether and how well they dis-
criminate rewarded locations from non-rewarded locations, thus
demonstrating that subjects do or do not remember where the
rewards were. The following measures were used to describe and
analyze the participants’ behavior and performance: (1) the total
number of locations visited to ﬁnd the three rewards [total num-
ber visited (TNV)], an overall measure of task performance; (2)
the number of correct locations visited before making an error
[correct before error (CBE)], a measure of memory capacity; (3)
the number of errorless performers (NEPs) per group for each
trial [number errorless performers (NEP)], an evaluation of per-
fect memory performance; (4) The number of participants who
chose a rewarded location as theﬁrst location visitedupon entering
the arena [ﬁrst choice correct (FCC)]. For these analyses, we per-
formed general linear model (GLM) analyses to compare groups
across daily trials. We performed separate analyses for trials in
the LC and AS conditions. Because AS tasks requiring low spatial
resolution can be solved using either low-resolution topological
coding or high-resolution metric coding (Poucet and Benhamou,
1997), and the fact that these two coding mechanisms likely impli-
cate different hippocampal circuits (Lavenex and Banta Lavenex,
2013), we considered the possibility that different locations in
the arena might be encoded via different coding strategies and
thus remembered differentially. Speciﬁcally, whereas topological
coding may be used to discriminate location 5 from other non-
rewarded locations on the outer array, locations 8 and 10 require
precise metric coding in order to be reliably discriminated from
surrounding non-rewarded locations. We therefore analyzed the
types of locations chosen (either rewarded or non-rewarded) by
array (outer, middle, or inner) for (5) the ﬁrst choice and the
ﬁrst three choices of participants upon entering the arena, aver-
aged over the ten trials in the LC and AS conditions, and (6)
for the ﬁrst choice and the ﬁrst three choices upon entering the
arena during the probe trial (i.e., the ﬁrst trial of Day 2, in the
AS condition). For these analyses, we normalized the number of
choices based on the probability to make those choices, by divid-
ing the number of choices of a rewarded location on any array
by one and the number of choices of non-rewarded locations
on the same array by three. We performed repeated measures
GLM analyses to compare groups’ choices. Signiﬁcance level was
set at p < 0.05 for all analyses. All statistical analyses were per-
formed with SPSS 18.0 statistical software. There was no sex
difference in any of the analyses performed in the study, so we
pooled the data from males and females for the presentation of the
results.
RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHICS, INCLUSION CRITERIA AND AGE CORRELATIONS
Table 1 presents the demographics of the two groups of partici-
pants tested in this study. As planned, there was no difference in
Table 1 | Demographics of the two groups of participants tested in
this study.
Chronological age IQ Mental age
TD (7 M / 9 F)
Average: 4.91 103 4.97
Stdev: 0.55 11 0.73
Min: 4.08 89 3.90
Max: 6.07 124 6.16
DS (10 M / 10 F)
Average: 18.81 41 5.30
Stdev: 5.84 5 0.60
Min: 11.74 36 4.67
Max: 29.70 56 6.67
MA between individuals with DS and TD children [t(34) = 1.444,
p = 0.158].
In order to evaluate each participant’s overall understanding
and motivation to perform the task, we determined whether
individual participants exhibited selectivity in choosing rewarded
locations on the LC trials (Wilcoxon signed-rank test on correct vs
incorrect choices). All TD participants (16/16 or 100%) demon-
strated a preference for the rewarded locations on the LC trials.
Similarly, all but one participant with DS exhibited a preference
for the rewarded locations on the LC trials (19/20 or 95%; group
comparison: Chi-square = 0.823, p = 0.3643). However, two par-
ticipants with DS (the one that was not selective on LC trials and
one other) performed worse than the other participants with DS
on theLC trials (more than twoSDs from themeanof theDSgroup
in the analyses considered below). Moreover, neither of these two
individuals performed at above chance levels on the AS trials (see
Table 2, below). Thus, since we could not be sure that these two
individuals (a 26.3-year-old male with MA = 5.8 years and an
18.7-year-old male with MA = 5.1 years) understood the basic
objectives of the task, they were not included in the remaining
analyses (unless otherwise noted).
Whereas MA correlated with CA in TD participants (n = 16),
there was no relation between CA and MA in participants with
DS (n = 18). Although there was no group difference in MA, we
included MA as a covariate in our analyses of TNV, CBE, NEP,
and FCC, as we have previously shown a gradual improvement in
AS learning and memory capacities with age in TD participants
(Ribordy et al., 2013; Ribordy Lambert et al., accepted).
TOTAL NUMBER OF VISITS (TNV)
We determined the total number of visited locations to ﬁnd the
three rewards, an overall measure of task performance. On LC tri-
als (Figure 2A), there was no group [F(1,31) = 1.497, p = 0.230] or
MAeffect [F(1,31) =1.090,p=0.304], but a decrease of TNVacross
trials [F(9,279) = 2.184, p = 0.023]. TNVdecreased from the ﬁrst to
the second trial for TD participants [F(9,135) = 13.164, p < 0.001;
LC1 > LC2–LC10, all p < 0.05], and more gradually from the
ﬁrst to the fourth trial for participants with DS [F(9,153) = 12.655,
p < 0.001; LC1 > LC2 > LC4–LC10, all p < 0.05].
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Table 2 | Numbers of participants who exhibited selectivity for the rewarded locations on either their first or their first three choices upon
entering the arena, on LC andAS trials.
LC trials AS trials
Yes No Yes No
TD (n = 16) 16 0 100% 16 0 100%
DS (n = 20) 19 1 95% 10 10 50%
Group comparison Chi-square: 0.823 p = 0.3643 Chi-square: 11.077 p = 0.0009
FIGURE 2 |Total number of visited locations to find the three rewards
(TNV). (A) LC trials. (B) AS trials. The asterisks denote statistically
signiﬁcant group differences on a given trial at p < 0.05.
On AS trials (Figure 2B), there was an effect of group
[F(1,31) = 25.855, p < 0.001] and MA [F(1,31) = 12.701,
p < 0.001], and a non-signiﬁcant decrease of TNV across tri-
als [F(9,279) = 1.386, p = 0.194]. However, considering each
group separately, TNV decreased gradually across trials for both
TD [F(9,135) = 5.385, p < 0.001] and DS [F(9,153) = 3.134,
p = 0.002] participants. TNV was lower for TD participants than
DS participants on all AS trials, except for AS3 (all p < 0.05).
NUMBER OF CORRECT CHOICES BEFORE ERRING (CBE)
We determined the number of correct choices participants made
before making an error, i.e., visiting a non-rewarded location, a
measure of memory capacity. On LC trials (Figure 3A), there was
no group [F(1,31) = 0.830, p = 0.369] orMA effect [F(1,31) = 1.330,
p = 0.258]. CBE increased signiﬁcantly from the ﬁrst to the
second trial for TD participants [F(9,135) = 13.047, p < 0.001;
LC1 < LC2–LC10, p < 0.05] and more gradually from the ﬁrst
to the fourth trial for participants with DS [F(9,153) = 26.548,
p < 0.001; LC1 < LC2 < LC4–LC10, p < 0.05].
On AS trials (Figure 3B), there was an effect of group
[F(1,31) = 28.792, p< 0.001] andMA [F(1,31) = 21.506, p< 0.001],
and an interaction between groups and trials [F(9,279) = 3.462,
p < 0.001]. Considering each group separately, CBE increased
gradually across trials for both TD participants [F(9,135) = 12.574,
FIGURE 3 | Number of correct choices before erring (CBE), a measure
of memory capacity. (A) LC trials. (B) AS trials. The asterisks denote
statistically signiﬁcant group differences on a given trial at p < 0.05.
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p < 0.001] and participants with DS [F(9,153) = 2.946, p = 0.003].
CBE was higher for TD participants than participants with DS in
the second and the last ﬁve AS trials (AS2, AS6–AS10; all p < 0.05).
NUMBER OF ERRORLESS PERFORMERS
Because CBE is expressed as an average number of locations
remembered across individuals, it does not give an indication as
to whether some participants exhibited perfect memory perfor-
mance on some trials. We thus determined, for each trial, the
number of participants per group who made no errors. On LC tri-
als (Figure 4A), there was no group [F(1,31) = 0.116, p = 0.736] or
MA effect [F(1,31) = 1.592, p = 0.216]. NEP tripled from the ﬁrst
to the second trial, and increased gradually after the second trial to
include all participants on the tenth LC trial, for both theTDgroup
[F(9,135) = 9.542, p < 0.001; LC1 < LC2–LC10, all p < 0.05] and
the group with DS [F(9,153) = 20.828, p < 0.001; LC1 < LC2–LC10,
all p < 0.05].
On AS trials (Figure 4B), there was an effect of group
[F(1,31) = 18.949, p< 0.001] andMA [F(1,31) = 24.003, p< 0.001],
as well as an increase in NEP with trials [F(9,279) = 3.830,
p < 0.001], and signiﬁcant interactions between groups and tri-
als [F(9,279) = 3.462, p < 0.001], and between MA and trials
FIGURE 4 | Number of errorless performers (NEP), expressed as a
proportion of participants in each group: n = 16 forTD participants and
n = 18 for participants with DS. (A) LC trials. (B) AS trials. The asterisks
denote statistically signiﬁcant group differences on a given trial at p < 0.05.
[F(9,279) = 3.462, p < 0.001]. Considering each group sepa-
rately, NEP increased gradually across trials for both the TD
group [F(9,135) = 6.643, p < 0.001] and the group with DS
(F(9,153) = 1.972, p = 0.046]. NEP was higher for the TD group
than for the DS group in trials AS6–AS9 (all p < 0.05).
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS WITH THE FIRST CHOICE CORRECT
Wealso analyzed the number of participantswho chose a rewarded
location as their ﬁrst choice upon entering the arena, in order to
determinewhether participants withDS exhibitedmemory capac-
ities that would not be revealed by the more stringent measures of
performance described above. On LC trials (Figure 5A), there was
no group [F(1,31) = 2.431, p = 0.129] orMA effect [F(1,31) = 0.567,
p = 0.457]. The number of participants with the FCC increased
drastically from the ﬁrst to the second trial and remained stable
thereafter, including about 90% of participants for both the TD
group [F(9,135) = 9.542, p < 0.001; LC1 < LC2–LC10, all p < 0.05]
and the DS group [F(9,153) = 19.905, p < 0.001; LC1 < LC2–LC10,
all p < 0.05].
On AS trials (Figure 5B), there was an effect of group
[F(1,31) = 21.930, p < 0.001] and MA [F(1,31) = 5.894, p = 0.021],
as well as an increase in the number of participants with the FCC
FIGURE 5 | Number of participants whose first choice was correct
(FCC), expressed as a proportion of participants in each group: n = 16
forTD participants and n = 18 for participants with DS. (A) LC trials.
(B) AS trials. The asterisks denote signiﬁcant group differences on a given
trial at p < 0.05.
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with trials [F(9,279) = 2.658,p= 0.006], and an interactionbetween
MA and trials [F(9,279) = 1.926, p = 0.048]. Considering each
group separately, FCC increased gradually across trials for both
the TD group [F(9,135) = 6.024, p < 0.001] and the DS group
[F(9,153) = 2.195, p = 0.025]. FCC was higher for the TD group
than the group with DS in the second and the last ﬁve AS trials
(AS2, AS6–AS10; all p < 0.05).
INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE IN AS TRIALS
Although group analyses revealed clear differences between DS
and TD groups onAS trials (Figures 2–5), individual performance
seemed to vary greatly among participants with DS. Thus, in order
to evaluate each participant’s allocentric capacities, we determined
whether individual participants choose rewarded locations on the
AS trials signiﬁcantly more often than non-rewarded locations
(Table 2; includes all 20 participants with DS originally included
in the study). Above chance performance was determined for each
individual with a non-parametricWilcoxon signed-rank test com-
paring the number of correct choices (visiting a rewarded location)
and thenumber of incorrect choices (visiting anon-rewarded loca-
tion) for the ﬁrst and the ﬁrst three choices made during the ten
AS trials. As described above, all TD participants, and all but one
participant with DS, exhibited a preference for the rewarded loca-
tions on LC trial. In contrast, for the AS trials, whereas all TD
participants demonstrated an above chance level preference for
the rewarded locations, only 50% of participants with DS did so.
We therefore analyzed the individual performance of partic-
ipants across the ten AS trials based on the number of correct
choices before erring (CBE; as a proxy to estimate memory capac-
ity; Figure 6A) and the number of errorless trials (NET, as a
measure of perfect memory performance; Figure 6B). These two
analyses conﬁrmed the MA effects reported previously via the
GLM analyses of daily trials, and further revealed that, despite
signiﬁcant group differences, task performance improved simi-
larly with MA for both TD children and participants with DS.
Note, however, that the MA effect observed in participants with
DS appeared largely due to the performance of the twoparticipants
with MAs of 6.7 years.
LOCATION CHOICES IN AS TRIALS
Because AS tasks requiring low spatial resolution can be solved
using either allocentric topological coding or precision metric
coding (Poucet and Benhamou, 1997), and the fact that these
two coding mechanisms likely implicate different hippocampal
circuits (Lavenex and Banta Lavenex, 2013), we considered the
possibility that different locations in the arena might be encoded
via different coding strategies and thus remembered differentially.
Speciﬁcally, whereas topological coding may be used to discrim-
inate location 5 from other non-rewarded locations on the outer
array, locations 8 and 10 require precise metric coding in order to
be reliably discriminated from surrounding non-rewarded loca-
tions. Thus, in order to further characterize the group differences
that had been revealed by our various measures of task perfor-
mance, we analyzed the types of locations participants visited ﬁrst
upon entering the arena, across the ten AS trials. Since ten par-
ticipants with DS exhibited selectivity for the rewarded locations
on AS trials and eight did not (Table 2), we included two DS
FIGURE 6 | Relationship between mental age (MA) and task
performance inTD children and participants with DS. (A) Number of
correct choices before erring (CBE) in the AS condition. Typically developing
(TD) participants : CBE = 0.719 × MA – 1.920, R2 = 0.502,
F (1,14) = 14.090, p = 0.002. Participants with Down syndrome (DS):
CBE = 0.676 × MA – 2.779, R2 = 0.344, F (1,16) = 8.398, p = 0.010. The
slopes did not differ [t (30) = 0.226, p = 0.8224]. (B) Number of errorless
trials (NET) in the AS condition. TD participants: NET = 0.257 × MA – 0.937,
R2 = 0.394, F (1,14) = 9.098, p = 0.009. Participants with DS:
NET = 0.258 × MA – 1.248, R2 = 0.50184, F (1,16) = 17.990, p = 0.001. The
slopes did not differ [t (30) = 0.059, p = 0.9526].
sub-groups (DSyes, n = 10 and DSno, n = 8; note that the two
participants with DS who exhibited poor performance in the LC
trials are not included in these analyses) and the TD group in these
analyses.
For the ﬁrst choice upon entering the arena, we found a
group [F(2,31) = 21.219, p = < 0.001] and a choice effect
[F(5,155) = 50.063, p < 0.001], as well as an interaction between
groups and choices [F(10,155) = 6.634, p < 0.001]. TD partici-
pants chose the rewarded location on the outer array (location
5) more than any other location [Figure 7A; F(5,75) = 51.211,
p < 0.001; all p < 0.05], the rewarded location on the mid-
dle array (location 8) more than non-rewarded middle locations
(p < 0.05), and the rewarded location on the inner array (loca-
tion 10) more than non-rewarded inner locations (p < 0.05).
DSyes participants chose rewarded location 5 on the outer array
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FIGURE 7 |Types of locations visited for the first (A) and the first three
(B) choices upon entering the arena in the AS condition. 5: rewarded
location on the outer array; outer: non-rewarded locations on the outer
array; 8: rewarded location on the middle array; middle: non-rewarded
locations on the middle array; 10: rewarded location on the inner array;
inner: non-rewarded locations on the inner array.
more than any other location [F(5,45) = 25.277, p < 0.001;
all p < 0.05]; they did not discriminate other rewarded loca-
tions from non-rewarded locations on the middle and inner
arrays for their ﬁrst choice. DSno participants did not discrim-
inate any of the different types of locations [F(5,35) = 1.956,
p = 0.110].
For the ﬁrst three choices upon entering the arena, we found
a group [Figure 7B; F(2,31) = 16.046, p = < 0.001] and a
choice effect [F(5,155) = 30.850, p < 0.001], and an interac-
tion between groups and choices [F(10,155) = 7.717, p < 0.001].
TD participants chose the outer rewarded location 5 more than
any other location [F(5,75) = 41.609, p < 0.001; all p < 0.05],
the middle rewarded location 8 more than non-rewarded middle
locations (p < 0.05), and the inner rewarded location 10 more
than non-rewarded inner locations (p < 0.05). DSyes partici-
pants also chose the outer rewarded location 5 more than any
other location [F(5,45) = 17.220, p < 0.001; all p < 0.05, except
for 5 vs. 10, p = 0.068], the middle rewarded location 8 more
than non-rewarded middle locations (p < 0.05), and the inner
rewarded location 10 more than non-rewarded inner locations
(p < 0.05). DSno participants did not discriminate between any
of the different types of locations [F(5,35) = 0.437, p = 0.819].
TYPES OF CHOICES IN THE PROBE TRIAL
In order to evaluate the participants’ long-term (24 h) memory,
we analyzed the types of locations participants visited ﬁrst upon
entering the arena on a probe trial, the ﬁrst trial on Day 2 per-
formed in the AS condition. We compared the TD group and the
two sub-groups with DS (DSyes, n = 10 and DSno, n = 8).
For the ﬁrst choice upon entering the arena, we found a group
[F(2,31) = 12.554, p < 0.001] and a choice effect [F(5,155) = 14.575,
p < 0.001], and an interaction between groups and choices
[F(10,155) = 3.215, p < 0.001]. TD participants chose the outer
rewarded location 5 more than any other location [Figure 8A;
F(5,75) = 15.769, p < 0.001; all p < 0.05]; they did not discrim-
inate the other rewarded locations 8 and 10 from non-rewarded
locations. DSyes participants also chose the outer rewarded loca-
tion 5 more than any other location [F(5,45) = 9.949, p < 0.001; all
FIGURE 8 |Types of locations visited for the first (A) and the first three
(B) choices upon entering the arena in the probe trial, the first trial of
Day 2 performed in the AS condition. 5: rewarded location on the outer
array; outer: non-rewarded locations on the outer array; 8: rewarded
location on the middle array; middle: non-rewarded locations on the middle
array; 10: rewarded location on the inner array; inner: non-rewarded
locations on the inner array.
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p < 0.05]; they did not discriminate the other rewarded locations
8 and 10 from non-rewarded locations. DSno participants did not
discriminate anyof the different types of locations [F(5,35) = 0.565,
p = 0.726].
For the ﬁrst three choices upon entering the arena, we
found a group [F(2,31) = 6.370, p = 0.005] and a choice effect
[F(5,155) = 6.675, p < 0.001], and an interaction between groups
and choices [F(10,155) = 3.397, p < 0.001]. TD participants
chose the outer rewarded location 5 more than any other location
[Figure 8B; F(5,75) = 10.941, p < 0.001; all p < 0.05], the middle
rewarded location 8 more than non-rewarded middle locations
(p = 0.063), and the inner rewarded location 10 more than non-
rewarded inner locations (p = 0.018). DSyes participants chose
the outer rewarded location 5 more than non-rewarded locations
[F(5,45) = 4.329, p = 0.003; 5 vs. outer, p = 0.095; 5 vs. middle,
p = 0.030; 5 vs. inner, p = 0.004]; they did not discriminate other
rewarded locations from non-rewarded locations. DSno partici-
pants did not discriminate any of the different types of locations
[F(5,35) = 1.177, p = 0.340].
DISCUSSION
ALLOCENTRIC SPATIAL MEMORY DEFICITS IN DS
In the current study, we found that individuals with DS were able
to discriminate the rewarded locations in presence of LCs as well
as MA-matched TD children. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that partic-
ipants with DS understood the basic objectives of the task, and
that they could initiate and sustain a selective search, including
inhibiting searching unrewarded locations, when they knew where
the rewards were hidden. It also conﬁrms that the fact that the two
groups of participants were tested in two different locations, and
given instructions in their native language (in Italian by a bilin-
gual experimenter (GK) for the DS participants in Nardò, and in
French for the TD children in Vaud), did not impact the reported
ﬁndings.
In contrast, as a group, individuals with DS discriminated the
rewarded locations onAS trials, in absence of LCs, signiﬁcantly less
well than MA-matched TD children. Participants with DS made
fewer correct choices before erring, visited more locations in order
to ﬁnd the three rewards, had fewer errorless performers, and fewer
correct ﬁrst choices thanMA-matchedTDchildren. It is important
to recognize that errors in our task, i.e., visiting unrewarded loca-
tions, could not be due to perseverative (working memory) errors
since once a location was searched, the cup associated with that
location was removed. Thus, incorrect searches represent spatial
memory errors, signifying that participants either (1) mistakenly
believed that the searched location hid a reward, or (2) did not
know where the rewards were hidden.
However, analysis of individual performance revealed that not
all individuals with DS performed the same. Our results indicate
that for 50% of the participants with DS (10/20) the ability to
solve a complex AS memory task with multiple goal locations
distributed amongst decoy locations was beyond their capacity. In
contrast, 50% of the participants with DS (10/20) were capable
of discriminating rewarded locations on AS trials at above chance
level. Among those, two individuals with DS (MA > 6.5 years)
consistently performed errorless AS trials, and had scores similar
to MA-matched TD children.
Thus, in order to summarize our results, we must choose
between two views. On the one hand, our ﬁnding that 50% of
participants with DS performed above chance on AS trials leads
to seeing “the glass half full.” On the other hand, our ﬁnding that
50% of participants with DS did not perform above chance on
AS trial leads to seeing “the glass half empty.” However, it must
be kept in mind that even though 50% of the individuals with
DS exhibited above-chance performance, for the majority of these
individuals (8/10), their performance was still impaired compared
to that of MA-matched TD controls. Moreover, even though 48-
month-old TD children exhibited above-chance performance on
our task, AS memory capacities are still improving at this age
and have not reached adult-like levels, or even the level that they
will achieve at 6.5 years (Figure 6). Thus, considering all of our
ﬁndings, it seems most accurate and parsimonious to conclude
that AS learning and memory capacities are signiﬁcantly impaired
in DS.
SPATIAL MEMORY PERFORMANCE AND MENTAL AGE
We, along with others, have previously shown that AS mem-
ory processes emerge around 2 years of age in TD children
(Newcombe et al., 1998; Ribordy et al., 2013), and that AS res-
olution improves from 2 to 4 years of age (Ribordy et al., 2013;
Ribordy Lambert et al., accepted). The present study further
reveals that AS memory processing continues to improve beyond
4 years of age, showing a positive correlation between spa-
tial memory performance and MA in TD children between 4
and 7 years (Figure 6). We also found a positive correlation
between performance and MA in participants with DS. How-
ever, it appears that this correlation was strongly inﬂuenced by
the above-average performance of two participants with DS. It is
of particular interest to note that the two participants with DS
that performed similarly to MA-matched TD children had MAs
of 6.7 years, and that this was the highest MA of all of our DS
participants.
A number of previous studies have suggested that AS com-
petence improves with age in TD children, and that mature,
adult-like competence is not achieved until around 7 years of
age [see (Newcombe and Huttenlocher, 2000) for detailed dis-
cussion]. For participants with DS and a MA of less than 6 years,
there is no correlation between MA and performance on our task,
whereas for TD children, in contrast, the correlation between
MA and performance is evident even if we consider only those
children younger than 6 years. Because proper hippocampal func-
tion is critical for AS learning and memory (Banta Lavenex
et al., 2014), and AS memory performance correlates with MA
(Ribordy et al., 2013; Ribordy Lambert et al., accepted, current
study), it is reasonable to ask whether there is a causal relationship
between hippocampal development and MA in typical develop-
ment. Speciﬁcally, does proper hippocampal function inﬂuence
cognitive performance in general? Moreover, can variations in spa-
tial memory capacities in DS be informative about brain functions
that underlie the cognitive processes contributing to the deﬁnition
of MA in DS. Do individual variations in discrete hippocampal
(dys)functions affect some of the cognitive processes that are typ-
ically assessed, and deﬁne MA, in standard neuropsychological
evaluations?
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EVIDENCE OF HIPPOCAMPAL DYSFUNCTION IN DS
It has been previously suggested that DS is characterized as a
syndrome impacting late-developing brain structures such as the
hippocampus, the prefrontal cortex and the cerebellum (Uecker
et al., 1993; Pennington et al., 2003; Menghini et al., 2011; Edgin,
2013). Given the numerous neuroanatomical abnormalities that
have been noted in the fetal DS brain, due in large part to
widespread reduction in the proliferation of neuronal precursors
(Contestabile et al., 2010; Guidi et al., 2011), it seems unlikely that
cognitive deﬁcits in DS would be limited to impairments arising
from deﬁcient hippocampal or prefrontal processing. Neverthe-
less, due to the important role that the hippocampus plays in
learning and memory, it is of particular interest to determine
whether, and to what extent, hippocampus-dependent memory
functions are impaired in DS.
Spatial memory
Five prior studies have investigated the spatial capacities of indi-
viduals with DS. Mangan (1992) tested very young DS and TD
children (16–28months) on three different tasks designed to assess
spatial andnon-spatial capacities. Twoof these tasks, a cue learning
task and an egocentric response learning task, are hippocampus-
independent tasks requiring dorsal striatal and parietal cortex
involvement (White and McDonald, 2002; Weniger et al., 2009).
In contrast, the third task, a place learning task, requires hip-
pocampus involvement. Although children with DS were capable
of learning to solve all three tasks, children with DS were more
greatly impaired on the hippocampus-dependent AS task than
on the hippocampus-independent spatial tasks. Pennington et al.
(2003) compared the performance of DS and MA-matched TD
children on an extensive series of tests evaluating independent
behavior (Scales of Independent Behavior), general cognition
[Differential Abilities Scale (DAS), PPVT, CANTAB Spatial Span,
TROG, CELF, DAS Recall of Digits], hippocampal function, and
prefrontal function. They found deﬁcits on all tasks believed to
depend on hippocampal function, including a virtual Morris
water maze task. It is important to note, however, that Edgin
et al. (2010) did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between individu-
als with DS and MA-matched TD children on a similar virtual
Morris water maze task, potentially highlighting the relatively
poor performance of young MA-matched TD children on virtual
spatial tasks. Courbois et al. (2013) investigated DS wayﬁnding
abilities in a virtual environment. Although participants with DS
could learn the required routes through the virtual environment,
they needed more trials to reach criterion than participants of
the same CA, and fewer DS than CA participants, were able to
make a shortcut in the virtual environment (2 of 7 vs. 10 of
10), demonstrating impairments in their ability to use allocen-
tric representations in virtual environments. Similar to the Edgin
et al., (2010) study, however, Courbois et al., also found that only
5 of 9 MA-matched TD children were able to make the short-
cut in the virtual environment. In further virtual route-learing
experiments, Purser et al. (2014) found that individuals with DS
made more errors than MA-matched TD children using proxi-
mal cues (junction and path landmarks) within the maze, that
errors were associated with poor inhibition and overall cogni-
tive ability, and that individuals with DS with low non-verbal
ability were more impaired than individuals with higher non-
verbal ability. In contrast, when participants were required to
use distal visual landmarks found outside the maze, they found
that the developmental trajectory of performance (i.e., the rela-
tionship between non-verbal abilities and the number of errors
in the virutal maze) did not differ between individuals with
DS and MA-matched TD individuals. In sum, whereas all of
these studies demonstrate that individuals with DS exhibit gen-
eral impairments in spatial learning, the studies conducted in
virtual envrionments also show that young MA-matched TD chil-
dren have difﬁculty with the purportedly more allocentric aspects
of the task, and that the performance of individuals with DS
and MA-matched TD children do not necessarily differ on these
aspects.
In contrast, in our study, although 50% of the participants
with DS demonstrated above chance performance in our AS task,
all MA-matched TD children demonstrated above chance perfor-
mance. Futhermore, the performance of 90% of the individuals
with DS we tested was below that of MA-matched TD children.
Thus, considering the previous suggestive but not unequivocal
ﬁndings cited above, together with our current ﬁndings show-
ing signiﬁcant impairments in real-world AS memory processing
in 90% of individuals with DS, it seems reasonable to conclude
that hippocampus-dependent spatial learning and memory are
consistently impaired in DS, and that individuals with DS exhibit
performance consistently below that of MA-matched TD controls.
Explicit memory
Explicit memory, our ability to bring to mind or recall a stored
memory, has been shown to be dependent on hippocampal
integrity, whereas implicit memory has been shown to be essen-
tially preserved following hippocampal damage (Squire, 1992).
Carlesimo, Vicari and colleagues therefore reasoned that if the
hippocampal memory system was disproportionately impaired,
participants with DS should perform relatively better on implicit
memory tasks, and relatively worse on explicit memory tasks. Car-
lesimo et al. (Carlesimo et al., 1997) and Vicari et al. (Vicari et al.,
2000) compared theperformanceof individualswithDSon tests of
implicitmemory (e.g., Tower of London task; FragmentedPicutres
task; Serial Reaction Time test; and Stem Completion test), and
explicit memory (e.g., Free Recall of a list of unrelated words;
explicit recognition of previously viewed words; Corsi Supras-
pan test; and explicit recognition of previously viewed images;
prose recall). Both studies showed that whereas participants with
DS exhibited normal implicit memory capacities, and especially
MA-appropriate levels of priming, their explicit memory capaci-
ties were impaired as compared to TD children. Thus, similar to
AS memory studies, explicit memory studies also suggest that the
hippocampus-dependent memory system is speciﬁcally impaired
in DS.
Contextual memory
Context, the visual, spatial or situational details associated with
a memory, can facilitate memory recall (Lever and Burgess,
2012). Because the hippocampal formation is known to integrate
and associate (bind together) multiple components of perceived
objects, locations and events, it is believed to play a prominent role
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in contextual processing (Hoscheidt et al., 2010; Ognjanovski et al.,
2014; Pfeiffer et al., 2014). Edgin et al. (2014) studied the effect of
context on object recognition in individuals with DS (10–29 years)
and TD children (3–6 years) and adolescents (10–16 years). Inter-
estingly, they found that the performance of participants with DS
was similar to that of the 3–4.5 year old children in that they
exhibited better recognition when test objects were viewed in the
same context in which they had been seen initially than when
their context was absent. This type of performance is thought to
correspond to a nascent stage of processing that is driven by the
encoding and recall of unitized (fused) object and context repre-
sentations. Indeed, when viewed out of context, 3–4.5 year old
TD children and individuals with DS do not judge previously seen
objects as familiar. These results thus suggest that hippocampal
processing in adolescents and adults with DS (10–29 years old) is
similar to that of 3–4.5 year old TD children. Interestingly, our
results are in agreement with this estimation. In our task, the
majority of participants with DS performed similarly to our poor-
est performing TD participants that were between 4 and 4.5 years
of age.
In sum, studies examining a range of different types of
hippocampus-dependent memory, from the explicit recall of
verbal, visual and visuospatial material (Vicari et al., 2000; Car-
lesimo et al., 2001; Pennington et al., 2003), to contextual binding
(Edgin et al., 2014), to AS memory capacities (Pennington et al.,
2003; Courbois et al., 2013; current study), have demonstrated
signiﬁcant impairments in DS. The fundamental role of the hip-
pocampus in learning and memory for explicit, autobiographical,
relational, andAS information, aswell as its role inboth short-term
and long-term memory (Scoville and Milner, 1957; Squire, 1992;
Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005;
Hoscheidt et al., 2010; Hunsaker and Kesner, 2013; Banta Lavenex
et al., 2014) likely mean that global impairments in hippocampal
function, as would be seen following structure-wide reductions
in cell proliferation (Contestabile et al., 2010; Guidi et al., 2011),
will end up further affecting other aspects of cognition. The high
degree of interconnection between the hippocampus and other
cortical regions could mean that disrupted hippocampal process-
ing might act synergistically with inefﬁcient processing in other
cortical areas to produce greater deﬁcits than might be expected
based on processing deﬁcits in individual cortical structures alone.
Future studies should try to asses the contribution that hippocam-
pal impairment might have on both general aspects of cognition,
such as the relation between hippocampal function and MA, as
well as speciﬁc aspects of cognition such as short-term memory
for non-spatial information (Banta Lavenex et al., 2014).
DISRUPTION OF DISTINCT HIPPOCAMPAL CIRCUITS IN DS
The hippocampal formation has been proposed to subserve two
complementary but partially dissociable spatial coordinate sys-
tems (Poucet and Benhamou, 1997). The CA1 region of the
hippocampus is thought to subserve allocentric topological cod-
ing, where locations are coded in relation to distal environmental
objects in a relatively gross manner (location X is closer to the
window than it is to the door), which does not necessitate high-
resolution spatial representation. In contrast, the dentate gyrus
and its projection to CA3 is thought to subserve high-resolution
metric coding of space and the process of spatial pattern sep-
aration, which serves to transform neural representations of
locations into more dissimilar, non-overlapping neural represen-
tations (Gilbert et al., 1998). Support for this bipartite system
comes from experiments showing that lesions of the dentate gyrus
do not entirely disrupt AS memory capacities, as rodents are
still able to ﬁnd one goal location in the Morris water maze
(Brun et al., 2002; Nakashiba et al., 2008), but they do disrupt
the animals’ ability to distinguish closely apposed locations in
AS memory tasks (Gilbert et al., 1998, 2001; Gilbert and Kesner,
2006).
Knowledge of the different computational roles played by dis-
tinct hippocampal circuits offers the possibility of using paradigms
that can distinguish between behavioral deﬁcits potentially due
to pathology in distinct regions of the hippocampal formation.
For example, if participants with DS demonstrate that they can
learn and remember locations that can be discriminated using
allocentric topological coding (location 5 in the current study),
but not locations which require high-resolution spatial encod-
ing (locations 8 and 10), this would suggest that the CA1 region
of the hippocampus and its afferent circuitry might be relatively
intact, but that the dentate gyrus/CA3 region is relatively impaired.
In contrast, if participants with DS are incapable of learning to
discriminate even locations that, theoretically, can be discrim-
inated using allocentric topographical coding (location 5), this
would suggest that CA1, the dentate gyrus and CA3 are similarly
impaired.
In the current study, we saw limited behavioral evidence
potentially reﬂecting selective impairment in distinct hippocam-
pal circuits in DS. During the regular AS trials and the probe
trial, TD children showed consistent evidence of being able to
discriminate all rewarded locations (locations, 5, 8, 10) from
never-rewarded locations, suggesting both topological and high-
resolution coding capacities. In contrast, the 50% of participants
with DS who exhibited below chance performance on AS trials
did not show any evidence of being able to discriminate even
rewarded location 5, on the outer array, based on its topological
relations to distal environmental cues. The 50% of participants
with DS who exhibited above chance performance on AS trials
exhibited an intermediate pattern. They showed clear evidence of
being able to discriminate the rewarded location 5 on the outer
array during both the regular AS trials and the probe trial after
a 24-h delay, suggesting the ability to form a long-term topo-
logical spatial representation. Their ability to discriminate the
other rewarded locations (8 and10),which require high-resolution
spatial coding capacities, was inconsistent during the regular AS
trials (Figure 6) and was not signiﬁcant during the probe trial
after a 24-h delay (Figure 8). However, among those individu-
als with DS, two participants performed as well as MA-matched
TD children, and clearly discriminated the rewarded locations
8 and 10, on the middle and inner arrays, which require the
ability to form a high-resolution metric representation of the
environment.
Although not entirely conclusive, these preliminary results
suggest that important differences exist in the ability of indi-
viduals with DS to form different types of AS representations
of the environment (topological versus high-resolution metric
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representations). Moreover, it is also possible that for the par-
ticipants with DS who failed to show any preference for the
rewarded locations on AS trials, the spatial resolution needed to
solve the current task was already too high, or that the memory
load (three locations) made it too difﬁcult for them to remember
even one location using topological information. Systematic inves-
tigations of the inﬂuence of spatial resolution and memory load
are thus required to more ﬁrmly establish possible links between
dysfunction of speciﬁc hippocampal circuits and the AS mem-
ory capacities of individuals with DS in large-scale, real world
environments.
CONCLUSION
We have found that individuals with DS could use LCs at a level
similar to that of MA-matched TD children in order to identify
three rewarded locations among 12 potentially rewarded locations
distributed in a 4 m × 4 m square arena. In contrast, in the absence
of LCs,whenparticipantsmust use an allocentric representation of
the environment to learn and remember the location of the three
rewards, individuals with DS were impaired. This impairment in
AS processing stands in contrast to the previously reported preser-
vation of visuospatial capacities demonstrated by individuals with
DS on small-scale, egocentrically presented tasks. However, our
study also identiﬁed important individual variations, with 50% of
the participants with DS incapable of any AS learning, 40% capa-
ble of better than chance, but less than MA-matched, levels of AS
learning, and 10% capable of MA-matched levels of AS learning.
These results suggest the existence of identiﬁable, individual dif-
ferences in speciﬁc hippocampus-dependent memory functions.
Future studies should asses the inﬂuence of spatial resolution and
memory load on the AS memory capacities of individuals with
DS in order to investigate potential individual and region-speciﬁc
hippocampal pathologies.
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